









The aim of this special issue, Morten Nielsen has explained, is analytically to conjoin 
‘urban’ and ‘time’ the better to conceptualize contemporary predicaments, anxieties and 
challenges of social life in the world’s cities. The invitation is to a temporally orientated 
ethnography of urban life. 
Nielsen wants us to take this proposal absolutely literally. If cities have been 
characterized thus far in terms of an intensified spatial agglomeration of persons and 
things then there is an imminent need, he claims, to understand also an inherently 
temporal aspect to these processes. Nielsen’s contributors then chart how temporal 
topologies are implicated in the lives of urbanites in a diversity of settings throughout the 
world. The temporal city comes to be at once a frame of mind, a social condition, a 
methodology and a political-cum-moral programme.  
 
Discomfiture in time 
My intention in this epilogue is a comparatively narrow one. I would draw attention to 
one theme in particular, variations on which recur throughout the volume. The theme 
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concerns discomfiture in time, by which I mean a sense of uncertainty with passing time; 
also a seeking out of certainty and fixity—in effect, beyond time—to offset the 
discomfort. The temporal city is a site that foregrounds questions of individual senses of 
existential security. 
Let me first briefly rehearse how this theme appears in the context of the different 
contributions: 
* In a poor Recife neighborhood, characterized by material want, lack of mobility 
and acute physical crowding, Anne Line Dalsgaard depicts people’s uncertainty 
concerning whether their and their neighbours’ lives are temporally synchronized. 
Without knowledge of one’s interlocutors’ imagined futures, one cannot be sure of their 
current motives towards oneself and of their sincerity. Can they be loaned money? In an 
attempt to offset their discomfiture, residents try to read their individual neighbours’ 
character: a ‘simple’ person is trustworthy because he or she is not two or plural, but 
hardworking and stable over time. Here is time both as resource and impedance. 
* In post-socialist Ulaanbaatar and its sprawling peri-urban townships, Morten Axel 
Pedersen describes how for many urbanites a large proportion of an average day is 
dedicated to tracking down others by whom they are owed money, or looking for 
potential creditors from whom they could themselves borrow. Debt compels a particular 
kind of movement around the city; also a particular kind of nostalgia. During the 
‘socialist age’ relations of debt were longterm and mostly restricted to closed circuits of 
friends; with the dawning ‘age of the market’, both the number of debt obligations and 
the size of monetary loans have expanded dramatically. Yet there is little regulation or 
formalization of this lending, whether legal, moral or temporal. The fact that people keep 
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on lending and borrowing money regardless—and irrespective of people’s reputed 
trustworthiness—shows debt acquiring a gift-like quality. 
* In a Kingston where bursts of economic inflation have disrupted the predictability 
of many kinds of street transactions and relationships, where infrastructural collapse 
means that many have no access to sewerage and water flow is often disabled, and where 
political terrorism condenses urbanites into garrison communities, Huon Wardle 
describes the practice of affording temporal experience a spiritual accountability. Social 
life is experienced as a double-bind: transient and free-floating on the one hand, 
intransitive and blocked on the other. It is ‘a sufferation’. However, for members of the 
Jamaican spiritist church, ‘Revival Zion’, the Holy Spirit and angels activate gifts innate 
to the particular individual which provide an anchoring point for personal experience and 
also an index of permanence.  
* In contemporary Madrid, Alberto Corsín Jiménez describes a kind of sociality 
based on the rationality and the temporality of the mortgage: mediated by legalistic 
language and actuary calculations, and characterized by talk of interest rates, square 
metreage and real-estate brokers. Urban life is rendered a physical and social project ‘in 
construction’ and ‘in-progress’, permanently in suspension, founded upon a hopeful yet 
fearful economy of credit. The ‘mortgaged polis’, Corsín Jiménez urges, is a 
contemporary urban condition of accelerated time, of conspiracy and apocalypse, whose 
sensorial and experiential rhythms oscillate between urgency and uncertainty, and 
hopefulness and expectation. Madrid emerges as a tricksterish figure conjuring up 
subjective worlds of turbulence and confusion, but also hope. 
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* Andrew Irving’s concern is to know New York’s Lower East Side as a ‘semantic’ 
neighbourhood mediated by modes of internally represented experience, expression and 
memory: unvoiced speech-acts and internal conversation. In particular he would reveal 
the mental and emotional shift among New York men and women living with HIV/AIDS 
that accompanied the arrival in the mid-1990s of anti-retroviral medications. Time and 
space have been ‘re-opened’ for these people but their physical neighbourhood  remains a 
mnemonic of radical changes in being, belief, and perception, of the loss and contingency 
that accompany terminal illness. 
* In the setting of London zoo, Adam Reed finds individuals reflecting on their lives 
in the city and also able to set up a critical distance from an everyday human condition, at 
least to an extent. While an individual human life, both planned or unfolding, possesses a 
modicum of freedom and control relative to those of the animals in the zoo, then—for 
which reason ‘time might well be up’ on the very idea of the zoo as an appropriate 
space—nevertheless there is a sense in which human and animal lives articulate. For the 
natural history of evolution suggests an understanding of time that is enveloping, out of 
individual control, and at the same time inclusive of all organic life. Evolution reveals an 
organic kinship in time, and a mutuality of life-trajectories, comparable to the 




Discomfiture in time is not a new finding. ‘Future shock’ was the way in which 
sociologist Alvin Toffler popularized an idea that rapid technological-cum-social change 
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was so major and so universal that the effect was equivalent to finding oneself immersed 
in another culture. Even if one stayed in the same physical space it became difficult to 
reconcile one’s changing environment with one’s world-views: difficult to measure, 
anticipate, treat, the passage of time. And yet, Toffler suggested (1970), ‘the future is our 
way of life’ inasmuch as the pace of change in human environments can be expected to 
grow rather than decrease. However popularist and broad-brush Toffler’s depiction was, 
in the urban strategies which the above ethnographic accounts variously detail one may 
read of members of contemporary cities universally experiencing a disorientation not 
unfamiliar to Toffler’s. 
 But then again, is such a disorientation necessarily so urban and so contemporary 
a phenomenon? Can one not be said to witness different degrees of temporal discomfiture 
at different historical periods and different physical sites? So that the phenomenon 
Toffler identifies as inherently contemporary and ‘modern’ is different in degree but 
perhaps not in kind to the experience of a ‘generation gap’ that repeatedly recurs in the 
historical record? In her historical reconstruction of the life of Martin Guerre in sixteenth-
century France, for instance, Natalie Zemon Davis (1983:2) cites the reminiscing of an 
old Breton peasant, Lubin (as recorded and published by the lawyer Noel du Fail in 1547) 
to the effect that when he (Lubin) got married at the age of thirty-four: ‘I hardly knew 
what it was to be in love (…), whereas nowadays there is hardly a young man past fifteen 
who hasn't tried something out with the girls’. One is humanly discomfited by the passage 
of time, including one’s ageing body, insofar as it delivers an inability to understand the 
behaviour and outlook of those younger or older than oneself, and one has recourse to 
strategies of displacement to assure oneself of an existential security: ‘things were 
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different, and better, before, and hence may be again’; ‘the generational miscreants will 
receive their come-uppance when their misbehaviour incurs the wrath of the gods or of 
the natural environment or their own ageing bodies’. There is a universality to 
discomfiture in time, one may conclude; such discomfiture is part of a human 
phenomenology that is as immediately sourced as our ageing bodies. 
However, I do not wish to disavow the originality and contemporaneity of 
Toffler’s observation either. There is something that a discomfiture in time points to that 
is very new and very up-to-date: very scientific and also esoteric. Let me quote from 
chemistry Nobel-Laureate, Ilya Prigogine: ‘In effect, all human and social interaction and 
all literature is the expression of uncertainty about the future, and of a construction of the 
future’ (1989:398). The wider context of Prigogine’s apparently presumptuous and 
reductive claim is a scientific thesis concerning the instability and creativity inherent in the 
natural world which makes absolute control and precise forecasting impossible. Instability 
has in the past been paradigmatically repressed, Prigogine elaborates, but talk in natural 
science today emphasises instability as against determinism, and creative engagement in 
the world as against an independent materialism. A clearer understanding is emerging, he 
suggests, of natural systems as ‘dualistic’: order and disorder co-exist and imply one 
another, although the relation between them is instable, non-equilibrial, unpredictable, 
distorted. The universe, on this view, (including our human nervous system, our human 
societies, earth’s climate and ecology) is intrinsically formed of disorder, while species of 
order float within it. The temporal horizon of possible prediction is small even if we are 
thoroughly conversant with starting conditions.  
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Paradoxically as it may seem, however, in a universe based on instability, human 
agency and creativity again become central to fundamental laws of the universe (for the 
first time since Galileo). Time is not something readymade that a supra-human 
consciousness unfolds, and humankind—the human individual—is a participant in the 
construction of natural order amid disorder. ‘Time is construction’, as Paul Valéry phrases 
it (cited in Prigogine 1989:399). The role of temporal-human-activity-within-nature turns 
this new universe into a riskier one than its determined predecessor but also a homelier one 
(potentially at least) for it includes the power of human agency and choice, and 
responsibility. 
 To return this to a more established social-scientific discourse is to recall Simmel’s 
discussion of modernity—epitomized by the urban—as an era and an attitude of mind 
characterized by excess: by stimulation, opportunity, choice and risk. For participants in 
urban milieux, who act as co-constructors of its social nature, the excess may lead to a 
blasé attitude, Simmel surmised (1971:329ff.), as a kind of defensive reaction to the 
fullness of modern experience. The key insight for Simmel, however, is that urban excess 
instantiates, inter alia, a freedom from limitations and constraints. The modern city is ‘the 
natural habitat of civilized man’, as his erstwhile student Robert Park (1968:3) phrased it. 
The excessive variety and difference that the city encompassed—however transitory, 
casual, instable and fortuitous may be the meetings and communications between this 
variety—was instrumental in facilitating a general expanding of the norms of civility in 
an expansive future. 
But then I am also aware that talk of ‘excess’ and ‘freedom from limitation’, of 
‘civility’ and ‘civilization’, can seem a far remove from the urban experience mapped in 
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this volume: from the billion people and more now occupants of squatter settlements that 
pervade the global developing city (and whose number the United Nations predicts as 
doubling in the next thirty years), as also from the seemingly more settled inhabitants of 
established cities for whom an aspirational life also appears under threat. How can we 
analytically allow for the temporal city as embodying both the instability and excess of 
creativity—of modern civilized man—and of potentially alienating collapse—of future 
shock? 
 
Anxiety of freedom 
Key to Morten Nielsen’s conceptualizing of the temporal city is a kind of relationality 
whose ontology owes much to individuals’ imaginative capacities. What there is in the 
urban milieu derives from what can be effected through an imaginative construction of 
time and space. The failures of urban infrastructure might mean that life is characterized 
by a permanent provisionality, and the likelihood of future plans coming to fruition might 
already, and always, have collapsed in the present …. and yet the present is still marked 
by the traces of those collapsed futures. The future that is always unrealisable still 
possesses a kind of negative resilience that acts as a gravitational pull on the present, 
leading one’s life and relations in a certain projected direction. 
 I read this as saying that the temporal city is home to a kind of method of hope. It 
is a site where the future pulls the present out of the past. Moreover, the capacity to 
occupy the temporal city as a frame of mind, to gather to oneself the wherewithal to 
begin the imagined journey from now to then, despite the instable project of any desired 
future outcome, is, I would say, to be read in this volume as a distinctive feature of 
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human experience. We find Andrew Irving’s informant, ‘Neil’, then, being buoyed up by 
hope in New York as we find Anne Line Dalsgaard’s ‘Eduardo’ in Recife, Huon 
Wardle’s ‘Jeanette’ in Kingston and Alberto Corsin-Jimenez’s ‘Luna’ in Madrid. As a 
frame of mind the temporal city is a kind of resource drawn upon to inject an excessive 
potential for the future into a debilitating present.  
 Endemic to the human situation, Kierkegaard suggested (anticipating Prigogine), 
was a constant striving; since at the heart of every individual life was a tension and unrest 
concerning future possibilities and yet ‘eternally it is the task of every individual to 
become an entire human being’ (1941:309). By ‘task’ Kierkegaard implied both necessity 
and duty. To be a human individual was to exist in a mode of becoming since one’s 
identity was a product of one’s will, one’s desire and one’s work. It was also the case that 
it was vital to exercise this human freedom, for an authentic and personal life was obliged 
to possess its own project and not to follow that of another: ‘It is not so much a question 
of choosing the right as of the energy, the earnestness, the pathos with which one 
chooses. Thereby the personality announces its inner infinity, and thereby in turn the 
personality is consolidated’ (Kierkegaard 1987:144). Individuality entailed choice and 
passion, freedom and commitment. At the same time, Kierkegaard recognised the anxiety 
associated with having the responsibility to face the future. The freedom of the individual 
could be dizzying and incur vertigo: ‘I could throw myself into the yawning abyss; I 
shall’. Notwithstanding, it is one’s human necessity and one’s duty at that point is to go 
on: to appreciate that ‘anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when (…) 
freedom looks down into its own possibility’ (Kierkegaard 1981:61). 
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 The setting from which ‘Urban Times’ emerges as a volume was a conference 
held at the University of St. Andrews under the auspices of the Centre for Cosmopolitan 
Studies, as was mentioned in the Introduction. One of the shorthands used to justify the 
Centre, and to depict the ‘cosmopolitan project’ in anthropology, is to say that it puts the 
concept of culture in its proper place. ‘Culture’ can be defined as those symbolic systems 
and those rhetorical devices by which particular conventional versions of the world’s 
objects and relations are classified and expressed in community exchange. But while 
cultural forms (systems and devices) facilitate expression and exchange they are not 
things-in-themselves, in possession of their own agency, and they do not represent some 
kind of horizon, shaping, limiting and determining (Rapport 1997, 2007).  
 ‘Culture’, in Michael Jackson’s (2002:125) summary, should ‘be seen as an idiom 
or vehicle of intersubjective life, but not its foundation or final cause’. Having borrowed 
the concept from nineteenth-century German Romanticism and lately seen the concept 
embraced and employed in an essentialistic, exclusionary sense by communitarian 
lobbyists involved in a politics of collective identity, the work of anthropology, Jackson 
urges, must now be deconstructionist: to ‘purge our discourse of the idealist connotation 
of the culture concept’ (2002:109-110). Cultures are symbolic tools, put to particular 
uses, but they do not represent destinies, they possess no hegemony over cognition and 
embodiment, and they speak more to the customary ‘truths’ of tradition and 
commensality than any knowledge of absolute ontologies. ‘Culture’ as set of 
conventional codes need in no way coincide with the true nature of being. As Ernest 
Gellner’s (1995:6) quipped: ‘A collectivity united in a false belief is a culture. Truths, 
especially demonstrable truths, are available to all and sundry, and do not define any 
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continuity of faith. But errors (…) tend to be the badges of community and loyalty’. The 
starting point of any adequate contemporary anthropology, Gellner went on to suggest 
(1993a:54), is to work out the social options and necessities of a post-Enlightenment 
world of ‘trans-cultural and amoral knowledge’. This is a world of mobility, 
egalitarianism and the ‘free, individualistic choice of identity’, but also of anxiety and 
insecurity: rapid change, fission and fusion, dispute (Gellner 1993b:3). 
 To ‘put culture in its place’, I would argue, is to recognise the ways and extents to 
which truth exists beyond cultures; as do also rationality, science, civilization and 
morality (Rapport 2011). A ‘cosmopolitan anthropology’—one that deems not culture to 
be its foundational concept, or even society, but the universal human actor, an ‘Anyone’, 
immersed in the instable world of his or her creative activities (Rapport 2010)—begins 
from the truth that there are universal human capacities and that these manifest 
themselves in individual human bodies: individuality incorporates the universal 
commonality of humanity.  
 The work of anthropology is then to flesh out this polar dimension: What it means 
to be an individual human being; How the dialectic of species wholeness (‘cosmos’) and 
embodied particularity (‘polis’) might give onto universal insights into humanity 
concerning knowledge and morality alike (Rapport 2009). Moreover, if individuality and 
humanity represent the poles of an ontological truth concerning the human condition, 
then classificatory distinctions that are erected between the individual and the human—
nation and community, ethnicity, religiosity and class—are to be critically examined and 
deconstructed. Cultural categories are recognised as rhetorical devices epiphenomenal 
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upon the ontological polar relation between individuality and humanity, and not 
misconceived as other than symbolic, idealist and instrumental. 
 On this view, if I say that the temporal city is at once a frame of mind, a social 
condition, a methodology and a political-cum-moral programme, then I am seeing its 
grounding as lying beyond the cultural. The temporal city evidences a general human 
complex of experience: it does not pertain to particular cultural constructions, particular 
communitarian or class memberships, or specific symbolic classifications of the world. 
Albeit that experience of the temporal city will come to be expressed and exchanged in 
different cultural forms (as the chapters in this volume attest), the anthropological work is 
to report on these en route to discerning human commonalities in the ethnographic 
diversity: to discovering what the temporal city discloses in the way of human 
capabilities and liabilities. Why is the freedom of modern constructive activity-in-the-
world sometimes a site of human suffering and sometimes of an authenticating creativity? 
How can the latter condition be nourished in urbane (‘humane’) settings and the former 
condition be guarded against? So that futurity is a fulfilment and not an alienation? 
 
Futurity as modern birthright 
The exchange of cultural forms, Michael Jackson (2002:126) suggests, is an instance of 
how human beings hope for intersubjectivity, which itself reflects a timeless human 
striving to strike a balance between autonomy and anonymity. That is, in order to ward 
off the anxiety of our solitary subjective embodied consciousness—faced with the 
uncertain future—we imagine groupness and common being, traditionalism and 
communication. Beyond these imaginings, however, beyond any such ‘phantasy of 
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groupness’ (Laing 1968:81), exists the truth of individuality and humanity: of the 
universalities of human embodiment and the particularities of discrete individual 
consciousness. It is to these ontologies, I have argued, that a cosmopolitan anthropology 
provides scientific and moral testimony. The anthropological objective, then, is to work 
out those social conditions wherein universal human capacities for creativity might find 
their fulfilment in every individual human life, irrespective of the accidental 
circumstances of their birth (and their urban life) and allowing for the intrinsic instability 
of our being-in-the-world.  
 Ideally, futurity may be conceived as a kind of human birthright. Human beings 
have the capacity to author their own individual versions of self, other and environment, 
their own cultural worlds or world-views (Rapport 1993). According to a cosmopolitan 
vision, moreover, they should enjoy the right to live by these individual versions at least 
to the extent that they do not curtail the rights of others. That is, a human life needs to 
pay no dues to versions of reality other than its own—to the symbolic classifications and 
traditions constructed by others. A life is the precious possession of its individual 
incumbent alone. It is destined to belong to no culture, no community, no state. The 
future is that ideal domain in which the individual becomes, and keeps on becoming, 
according to his or her own ‘choice, passion, freedom and commitment’ (to recall 
Kierkegaard’s phrasing). 
 If the future is accorded this space, then ‘modernity’, after Simmel, with its 
representative moment of urban excess, is a way to describe the distinctive latitude that 
has existed since the Enlightenment for free individual being and expression. Individual 
versions, world-views and life-projects are allowed to pile up against one another in an 
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‘urbane’ fashion (Rapport 2003). Modernity provides an opportunity for an excess of 
potential futures. Modern urbanity we have heard Morten Nielsen characterize as an 
‘intensified agglomeration’ of people and things, and of kinds of people and kinds of 
things. Modernity and urbanity together—which we might know as ‘the temporal city’—
offer that heady mix in which futurity might actually become a universal human 
birthright. This is not to downplay the favela of the global south and the collapse of 
welfare-state programmes elsewhere but to emphasise that anxiety and excess also 
instantiates the ‘dizziness of freedom’. 
 The rise of fundamentalist religions may attest, according to Zygmunt Bauman 
(1998), to individuals choosing to pledge their loyalties to a totalitarian ideology—to 
fundamentalist religiosity and to fascism—as an escape from risk. Anxiety is replaced by 
freedom from choice, big and small, with the promise of infinite powers of community, 
of collective ideology, tradition and leadership, being deployed towards the goal of 
existential security. Here, the potential futurity of a unique individual life is replaced by 
needs and rules proclaimed in the group's name and towards the reproduction of ‘it’s’ 
culture. The problems that such fundamentalism addresses are real, Bauman urges: real 
discomfiture in time. The issue, he concurs with Gellner, is to find non-totalitarian 
solutions. This, to repeat, is fundamental to the project of a cosmopolitan anthropology. 
 The importance of conceptualizing the temporal city, and providing ethnographic 
testament to its being individually lived, is also this: one discovers those conditions 
optimal to enjoying the human birthright to become. One recognises, in Jonathan Raban’s 
(1974) phrasing, the intrinsic ‘softness’ of the city: a time and a space awaiting the 
shaping intentionality of its individual resident but otherwise devoid of any intrinsic 
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supporting mechanisms. In the ideal temporal city—and notwithstanding the time and 
distance yet to travel—the individual fulfils capacities to author his or her own future 
while the anxiety of freedom and uncertainty do not psychically overwhelm and are not 
physically life-threatening. A discomfiture in time is perhaps part of the instability of the 
real but it does not alienate the individual from the modern, urbane opportunity to pursue 
a personal life-project. 
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